


Good morning, sir. Last week you sent us back to refine the operational and threat conditions, the decision points and assumptions associated with the deployment of three BCTs to Iraq. This brief is in response to guidance received during the previous SPM.




Sir, this is our purpose and the agenda we will follow.

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Sir, this is our understanding of guidance we received from you last week. PAUSE Sir, the blue text is my addition. I would like to confirm my interpretation of task four. On the subsequent slide I will lay out the guidance I heard at the Intelligence Fusion brief last week.




Sir, these are our take aways from the Intelligence Fusion briefing based on your guidance. Sir, what we would like to do now is frame the threat environment. I will be followed by (b)(3), (b)(6)


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
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
Sir, as we refined this briefing we identified some operational conditions had changed since this operation began. We show you these new operational conditions to allow you to reflect on your mission and intent, which follows this chart.



We began this planning effort with the problem of Baghdad's sectarian violence in mind. The question we asked ourselves was "How do we change the dynamics in Baghdad – that is, how do we reduce the level of sectarian violence? – while helping the GOI gain momentum on its path to security self-reliance?"

This is the mission statement the MNC-I commander approved following our mission analysis. It identifies securing Baghdad and its population as our task and reducing sectarian violence as our immediate purpose for doing so. We also see the task of securing Baghdad leading to the implementation of an Iraqi-led unified security command in Baghdad and the continued transition to security self-reliance throughout the country.

It's important to note that, while the focus is obviously on Baghdad, the corps sees this as a multi-divisional operation with outlying MNDs responsible for critical supporting efforts. The MNC-I commander has made this clear in his intent. We also recognize that this is much more than a military operation. It has economic and political components as well.



1st of 3 slides outlining the MNC-I commander's intent

(Pause)

Key to the purpose is the reduction of sectarian violence in and around Baghdad and placing the Iragis in the lead as we transition.

This is a combined operation, with the Iraqi lead increasing over time.

The operation has multiple components – it is not simply a military operation but one that is complemented by economic and political dimensions.


(Pause)

Near-term economic opportunities: use of CERP funds, USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP), high employment projects / low tech

Building toward long-term: micro-finance, VOTECH education, stateowned enterprise improvement

	SECRET/REL to USA and MCFUMR No Change
	Commander's Intent
	(2 of 3)
	Key Tasks – In conjunction with the ISF, secure the Iraqi people, with a focus on Baghdad; as a minimum:
	 Maintain robust forward presence – 24/7 CF coverage in clear, control, and retain areas until CF shift to the periphery
	 Be deliberate – resist the urge to surge; as the operation progresses, give priority to the retention and control of cleared areas; ensure the right amount of security forces are controlling the districts
	 Achievable – demonstrate real and perceived success, early-on and throughout the operation
	 Sustainable – as ISF and CF control expands, avoid overstretch and prevent re-infiltration; carefully consider the risks of committing to new clearing operations
	Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence Neutralize VBIED networks
	 Neutralize Valleb networks Neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJKs, IED and IDF attacks – balanced operations targeting groups on both sides of the sectarian divide
	- 1.4b, 1.4d
	In coordination with embedded PRTs and Interagency partners, Implement economic development initiatives and tribal engagements SECRET/REL to USA and MCE
comm	ander's key tasks
comm se)	ander's key tasks
	ander's key tasks

Economic development initiatives: engagement with select state-owned enterprises (SOEs), vocational education improvements, and better access to credit for small businesses




Sir, we have highlighted some text we believe needs to be amplified or revised. We believe reduction of violence to a manageable level deserves some further quantification. Some of these might include but are limited to the ISF ability to control cleared districts coupled with a decrease in the number of EJK related incidences and improved quality of life. Further we believe the development of the new Baghdad Operations Command make warrant amplification of the highlighted text to reflect the capability of the BOC at the completion of Phase II. Third we believe the term strike force has been superceded by the Operational Reserve and should be changed to reflect this new name. Sir, before we move into the employment options we also wanted to revisit the friendly forces operating in the support zones.

The endstate envisioned by the commander, addressing the state of security in Baghdad, how the GOI and ISF are perceived by Iraqis, transition (with respect to capability and C2 arrangements in Baghdad), and Coalition Force posture.

(Pause)

- Economic growth to occur in state-owned enterprises and private sector

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Sir, a quick study of this map reveals that two of the affected threat areas the C2 has highlighted as places where the potential exists to apply force are not under CF control. These area, first in the south are the Yusifiyah, Mahmudiyah and Latifiyah triad, which is under operational control of 4/6 IA. In the north the other area is western approach to Taji and it is under the operational control of 2/9 IA.

Sir, what I am going to do now is walk you through the employment options. I will first review each of your decisions associated with the appropriate BCT. Then I will lay out the timeline associated with each BCTs movement of equipment and personal and the recommended latest time you can decide where you want to employ them. This will be accompanied by, for your information, BCT capabilities. Finally, using the map you see now walk around the potential areas of employment and lay out the conditions for employment.

Decision Point 8 (4/1 ID) Decision: Request BCT #17 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad					
SIR	FFIR				
 What is the current level of violence in Baghdad? Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad? What is the status of militias in Baghdad? Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iragi Security Forces? What is the current status of the nine Security Framework Districts of Baghdad? What is the current level of violence in the Baghdad Security Belts? What is the status of key infrastructure? 	 Do we have enough forces to Clear, Control, and Retain Baghdad's nine Security Framework Districts? Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Security Belt? Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad? Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs? Do we have enough forces to oversee SIBs and / or protect key infrastructure? 				


Sir, this is your decision point, the desired effects, SIR and FFIR associated with the employment of 4/1 ID.

Approveo



Sir, 4/1 ID has requested 535 Up-armored HMMWVs, however we expect they will only be filled to approximately 400. This represents

APProveo




Sir, with this chart I am going to walk you around the threat areas and provide you a summary of the operational conditions and threat conditions when you deploy 4/1 ID to Baghdad. I will begin with Baghdad and then transition to Anbar, the Sunni Support Zone, Diyala and Baqubah/Balad and finally the southern belts. On this chart the task and purpose will appear for 4/1 ID alongside the threat and operational conditions. However, as subsequent areas are show the task and purpose will no longer appear. The threat conditions will appear in red and the operational conditions in blue. With that said, let me begin with Baghdad.

DO NOT MENTION UNLESS ASKED


Sir, Balad/Baqubah and Diyala will appear together. The reason I have not combined Diyala and Balad/Baqubah is because they are both cities are sectarian violence is prevalent.

Decision: Request BCT #18 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad Desired Effects: 1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure 3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized 3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops 4A: IED Network Neutralized				
 What is the state of the AQI threat in AI Anbar Province? What is the current level of violence in Baghdad/Baqubah? Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/ Baqubah? What is the level of violence in Baghdad? Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces? What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad? How effective are AQI insurgents in Baghdad's Support Zones? What is the current level of violence in Sadr City? What is the status of key infrastructure? 	 Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad security belt? Do we have enough forces to interdict/neutralize T&FFs along the TRV and ERV? Do we have enough forces to Clear, Control, and Retain Baghdad's nine Security Framework Districts? Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad? Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCS? Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Support Zones? Do we have enough forces to oversee SIBs and / or protect key hird stucture? 			
decision point for 3/3 ID.	17			
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Sir, your decision point for 3/3 ID.




Sir, at the bottom of the slide is the refined deployment timeline associated with 3/3ID. Above the timeline and for your information are the capabilities the HBCT brings. We anticipate 3/3ID will draw APS-5 and receive as many as 400 UAHs. Moving to the timeline at the bottom of the chart. The star indicates our assessment of the latest time we recommend you can change the BCTs assignment.




Sir, on 31 Mar an HBCT will be available for deployment into the area of operations. The differences from the 4/1 ID is this chart will not only provide threat and operational conditions, but recommended task and purpose associated with the BCT for each of the areas displayed on the previous chart similar to this one. Sir, in a dark blue color I have highlighted the new operational conditions and this will remain the same throughout the remaining two charts like this one. As before let me begin with Baghdad. You will notice at the bottom of the conditions box the two events we believe will be different at the time you have to decide where to employ this Brigade.

ý	Confirmation Decision Point 9b (4/2 SBCT)				
Decision: Request BCT #19 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad					
1B:	ired Effects: Populace in Urban Centers Secure Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized		Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops IED Network Neutralized		
SIR		FF			
1.	What is the current state of the AQI threat in AI Anbar? What is the current level of violence in the 9+1	1.	Do the Iraqi Security Forces have enough combat power to continue Clear/ Control/ Retain operations in Baghdad?		
3.	key cities? Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/Baqubah?	2.	Do we have enough forces to prevent the spread of violence in the 9+1 key cities? Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of		
4.	What is the status of militias in Baghdad / Baqubah?	4.	illegal contraband across the Iranian border? Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad?		
5.	Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?	5.	Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?		
6.	What is the current status of the nine Security Framework Districts of Baghdad?	6.	Do we have enough forces to secure Al-Anbar?		
7.	How effective are AQI insurgents in the Baghdad Security Belt?	7.	Do we have enough forces to secure the Support Zones?		
8.	What is the level of violence in Sadr City?	8.	Do we have enough force committed to the Operational Reserve to retain flexibility?		
9.	What is the status of key infrastructure?	9.	Do we have enough forces to oversee SIBs and or protect key intrastructure? 20		

Sir, this is your decision point for 4/2 SBCT.




And sir, here are the capabilities of the BCT for your information. 4/2 SBCT due to its Strykers will only require 120 UAHs largely for its sustainment element. That said, I would draw your attention to the timeline at the bottom of the chart and the star which indicates what we believe to be the latest possible time you could decide where to employ the BCT.



Sir, on this chart the threat conditions are not shown. However, at your request (b)(3), (b)(6) is prepared to provide the threat conditions. However, her threat conditions are driven by where you decided to employ 3/3 ID and the same will true with the 4/2 SBCT when we advance to 31 May when the 2/3 ID BCT is available for employment. Let me begin with Baghdad


Decision Point 9c (2/3 ID) Decision: Request BCT #20 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad					
SIR	FFIR				
 What is the current level of violence in Baghdad? Are the accelerants of violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad? What is the status of militias in Baghdad? Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces? What is the current status of the nine Security: Framework Districts of Baghdad? What is the status of key infrastructure? 	 Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad security belt? Do we have enough forces to enhance MITTs and dedicated TST forces? Does MNC-I possess the ability to Clear, Control, Retain Sadr City? Do we have enough forces to secure AL-Anbar? Do we have enough forces to secure SIBs and for protect key infrastructure? 				

Sir, this is your decision point for 2/3 ID.



Sir, there are no sustentative changes to the BCT organization that we are aware of. As opposed to 535 HMMWVs that should read 390-400. Sir, I direct your attention to the timeline at the bottom of the chart and the

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And finally, sir on 31 May you will have the final BCT of the five additional available for employment. (b)(3), (b)(6) is prepared to provide the threat conditions as required.


What I would like to do now is lay out the timelines of employment sideby-side.

Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett, USCENTCOM Chief of Staff Declassified on: 201505


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	Prime Minister's Directive
:	All Iraq's international borders will be closed DTG TBD Appointment of the Baghdad Operational Commander—all MoD and MoI forces assigned report to the BOC
•	BOC defined as 9 admin districts and the battlespace controlled by the 6 th (Yusafiyah, Latifiyah and Mamudiyah) and 9 th IA (south and west of Taji)
•	SoE measures include: Curfew in the BOC 8 PM to 6 AM except competent authorities and humanitarian emergencies No weapons carried in public and weapons, ammunition and dangerous materials permits suspended. PSDs can only carry weapons when they are with their principal With the assistance of MNF-I forces the BOC are authorized to question, search and detain, any person necessary IAW Iraqi Iaw Cordon, enter and search private and public property Seize contraband Control movement of persons and vehicles to include MoI and MoD convoys Conduct routs excurity clearance operations Apply preventative measures to all mail and wireless communications means and equipment
	 Impose restrictions on public places as necessary for safety and good order Persons who violate these measures or instigates, provides support or encourages such acts will be provided to be accounted with the provided set of the provided se
	subject to serious penalty IAW Anti-Terrorism Law All offenders will be dealt with before the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
•	MoD and MoI forces authorized to enforce Anti-Terrorism Law against illegal armed groups, terroris gangs, or any person who practices criminal and terrorists acts
:	Houses of worship will be respected. Houses of worship used by terrorists forfeit its protected status No citizen is to be displaced from his home. Illegal occupiers of IDPs house will be subject to legal
	proceedings, liable for damages, vacate the house and return contents to the owner
	Drivers and passengers must display valid license and vehicle registration—vehicles with tinted windows will be subject to legal proceedings under the Anti-Terrorism Law
•	Legal action will be taken against anyone who keeps a government vehicle at his house without official approval
•	MoD and MoI forces shall respect human rights when conducting security measures listed the PM Directive
-	
	601
	091



In-depth interdiction

-Additionally provided combat power will be arrayed along the CERV and Fallujah-Ramadi corridor

-At Korean Village, Recon Bn TF RIPs w/MEU and continues to **disrupt** AIF movement at the POEs, **Isolate** Rutbah, and **interdict** AIF movement along MSR Mobile

-Upon its arrival, a surge BN reinforces RCT-2. This allows RCT-2 to continue exploiting success in the CERV and WERV (clearing/retaining key cities and introducing ISF). Additionally, RCT-2 will interdict AIF movement along MSR Bronze/Phoenix.

-1-1 AD will be relieved by 1-3 ID. 1-3 ID (as MNF-W ME) continues to clear / retain Ramadi.

-Upon its arrival, a surge BN (-) reinforces RCT-6. RCT-6 will **interdict** AIF movement along MSRs Michigan, Mobile, Lincoln, and Chicago

-Reserve: 1 x Company from one of the surge Battalions

-Bottom Line: All actions are designed to either directly or indirectly interdict accelerant movement towards and into Baghdad.

-Basing Concept of Support: Currently COA's for the exact lay down of

the two surge battalions in AO Raliegh and Denver are being completed. Both RCTs are conducting RIPs. Expect a decision and employment plan by next week. In the mean time we have identified temporary billeting space at AI Asad for the surge Bn that will reinforce RCT-2 in AO Denver. The area is split into two tent LSA's.

-We have identified temporary billeting space for the surge Bn that will reinforce RCT-6 in AO Raliegh on Camp Fallujah. This battalion will also be in a tent camp.

-We are anticipating that both battalions will forward deploy companies A a bi iated to into designated AOR. Therefore we have developed a bill of material for a company sized expeditionary camp that is estimated to cost approximately \$450K and take 4-5 days to build.

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